美國(guó)正試圖破壞全球的科技供應(yīng)鏈，從而切斷華為的高端硅芯片供給，但是這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃有可能使美國(guó)自身后院失火。

A new $12 billion US chip plant sounds like a win for Trump. Not quite.

臺(tái)積電美國(guó)建廠是特朗普的勝利嗎？

On Friday, May 15, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), the world’s largest contract chipmaker, announced that it will build a $12 billion plant in Arizona, to open by 2024. It expects the facility to employ roughly 1,600 people and indirectly generate thousands of other jobs.

5月15日，全球最大的代工芯片制造商臺(tái)積電（臺(tái)灣積體電路制造商）宣布將在美國(guó)的亞利桑那州投資120億美元，用以修建一座芯片廠，并計(jì)劃于2024年之前啟用。預(yù)計(jì)這項(xiàng)設(shè)施將雇傭1600名員工，并且將衍生出數(shù)以千計(jì)的其他就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。

At first blush, the announcement looks like a victory for the Trump administration, which has been pushing to disentangle its technology supply chain from China—both by regaining its high-tech manufacturing capacity from Asia and by cutting off its own equipment and intellectual property from Chinese tech giants like Huawei. But the impact of the TSMC deal is far from clear cut and instead highlights just how intertwined the countries’ supply chains really are.

乍看之下，這項(xiàng)宣言看上去就像是特朗普政府在使科技供應(yīng)鏈與中國(guó)脫鉤的戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)中所取得的一次勝利。在其作戰(zhàn)計(jì)劃中，美國(guó)左右開(kāi)弓，一面從將高新科技的制造能力從亞洲收回到美國(guó)，一面限制來(lái)自中國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手取得美國(guó)的自有設(shè)備以及知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)。在這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)役中，首當(dāng)其沖受限的即是中國(guó)科技巨頭華為。但是此番臺(tái)積電的交易所產(chǎn)生的影響很難稱得上是清晰明確的，相反其更加凸顯了兩國(guó)在供應(yīng)鏈方面是多么盤根錯(cuò)節(jié)，緊密相纏。

TSMC is one of only three manufacturers in the world that produce the most advanced computing chips—those containing transistors 10 nanometers or smaller. The other two are South Korea–based Samsung Electronics and US-based Intel, which mostly reserves its advanced chips for its own products. For comparison, China’s largest domestic chipmaker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC), can’t produce anything smaller than 14-nanometer chips. Because of this, TSMC has increasingly found itself at the center of US-Chinese competition for technological dominance.

臺(tái)積電是世界上僅有的能生產(chǎn)最為先進(jìn)的10納米及以下級(jí)別計(jì)算機(jī)芯片的三家制造商之一，另外兩家則分別是韓國(guó)的三星和總部在美國(guó)的英特爾，但這兩家產(chǎn)出的先進(jìn)芯片大多都用于自己生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品之中。反觀中國(guó)，其國(guó)內(nèi)最大的芯片廠商——中芯國(guó)際能生產(chǎn)的最精細(xì)的芯片也僅為14納米級(jí)。正因如此，臺(tái)積電也愈加意識(shí)到，在中美爭(zhēng)奪科技主導(dǎo)權(quán)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中，它正處于戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)的中心位置。

Among TSMC’s largest customers are both Apple and Huawei, which the US Department of Commerce placed on its so-called entity list last year. Huawei’s inclusion on the list, along with 114 of its related affiliates, banned US companies from selling their technology to those firms without a special license. The department said the decision was made on the grounds of national security. It’s no coincidence that Huawei also plays a critical role in China’s technological development and expansion overseas, especially with the country’s AI and 5G strategies.

臺(tái)積電最大的客戶是蘋果和華為這兩家科技巨頭，后者在去年被美國(guó)商務(wù)部列入了其所謂的實(shí)體清單之列。由于此舉，在沒(méi)有特殊許可證的情況下，美國(guó)公司都被禁止向華為及與其相關(guān)的114家附屬機(jī)構(gòu)出售技術(shù)。商務(wù)部稱，這項(xiàng)決策是出于對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)的安全考量的基礎(chǔ)之上作出的。并非巧合的是，華為同樣在中國(guó)的科技進(jìn)步以及海外擴(kuò)張當(dāng)中扮演了關(guān)鍵性的角色，尤其是在中國(guó)的AI 和 5G戰(zhàn)略布局層面。

But the initial blacklist didn’t affect TSMC because it is not a US company. This offered Huawei a loophole to continue accessing the cutting-edge chips used to power its smartphones, AI projects, and 5G networks. On May 15, hours after TSMC’s plant announcement, the Department of Commerce sought to tighten that loophole by updating its export rules. Under the expanded regulations, any non-American chip producers that use American chipmaking equipment must also obtain a special license in order to sell to Huawei. Because the US is one of only a handful of countries dominating the design and production of such high-precision manufacturing equipment, which can often cost north of $100 million per machine, the rules thus bind TSMC as well as other advanced chipmakers that would be hard pressed to find alternatives. This effectively places Huawei’s supply of chips under the US Commerce Department’s control. As of May 18, TSMC had already stopped accepting Huawei’s orders, according to Nikkei Asian Review.

但這最初的黑名單并沒(méi)有對(duì)臺(tái)機(jī)電產(chǎn)生影響，因?yàn)樗�不是一家美�?guó)公司。這給華為提供了一個(gè)空檔，使其可以繼續(xù)購(gòu)買最先進(jìn)的芯片，用以賦能其生產(chǎn)的智能手機(jī)，AI 項(xiàng)目 以及 5G 網(wǎng)絡(luò)。在5月15日當(dāng)天，臺(tái)積電宣布將在美國(guó)設(shè)廠的數(shù)小時(shí)后，美國(guó)商務(wù)部就擴(kuò)大了其出口方面的禁令，以堵住這個(gè)空檔。新的出口規(guī)定之下，任何非美國(guó)公司只要使用了美國(guó)的芯片生產(chǎn)設(shè)備，就都需要獲得特殊許可，才能向華為出售自己的產(chǎn)品。高精度芯片的生產(chǎn)設(shè)備的造假動(dòng)輒上億美元，而美國(guó)是壟斷了這種設(shè)備的設(shè)計(jì)和制造的少數(shù)幾個(gè)國(guó)家之一。因此，新的規(guī)定就遏制住了包括臺(tái)積電在內(nèi)的一眾芯片廠商向華為銷售產(chǎn)品的商業(yè)行為，華為也很難找到不在限制范圍內(nèi)的其他供應(yīng)商。這些措施將華為的芯片供應(yīng)牢固地掌控在了美國(guó)商務(wù)部的手里。根據(jù)日經(jīng)亞洲周刊的報(bào)道，就在5月18日，臺(tái)積電已經(jīng)停止了接納來(lái)自華為的訂單。

“Semiconductor equipment is the weak link in China’s supply chain that America is really zooming in on,” says Neil Thomas, a senior research associate at the think tank Macro Polo, who studies US-China relations and the semiconductor supply chain. “Huawei can design state-of-the-art chips, just as good as perhaps chips that Apple can design. But what China can’t do is actually build those chips.”

“半導(dǎo)體設(shè)備是中國(guó)供應(yīng)鏈當(dāng)中的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)，也是美國(guó)正在瞄準(zhǔn)的點(diǎn)�！瘪R可波羅智庫(kù)研究中美關(guān)系和半導(dǎo)體供應(yīng)鏈的高級(jí)研究員Neil Thomas說(shuō)�！叭A為可以自行設(shè)計(jì)最為先進(jìn)的芯片，并且很可能達(dá)到美國(guó)蘋果公司的芯片設(shè)計(jì)水準(zhǔn)。但是中國(guó)沒(méi)有真正生產(chǎn)出這些芯片的能力�！�

Within this context, the planned plant takes on additional meaning. On Monday, the blow intended for Huawei inadvertently struck TSMC, which saw its stock price slip by 2.5% along with other Huawei suppliers. Some analysts now foresee the US Commerce Department granting it a license to continue selling to Huawei anyway, in order to keep the company on good terms to carry out its $12 billion deal. Whether TSMC made its announcement with knowledge of the upcoming change to the export ban is unclear, but Reuters reported that the decision to locate the plant in the US has already generated “good will” within the department all the same.

在這樣的背景之下，臺(tái)積電新的芯片工廠就被賦予了額外的意義。就在周一，這項(xiàng)針對(duì)華為的打擊出其不意地沖擊了臺(tái)積電，其股價(jià)股價(jià)下跌了2.5%，華為的其他供應(yīng)商股價(jià)也隨之下跌。一些分析師們現(xiàn)在預(yù)計(jì)美國(guó)商務(wù)部很可能會(huì)向臺(tái)積電頒發(fā)可以給華為進(jìn)行銷售的特殊許可，這樣可以保持與臺(tái)積電的和睦關(guān)系，從而繼續(xù)實(shí)施它價(jià)值120億美元的建廠計(jì)劃。目前還不清楚臺(tái)積電作出在美國(guó)設(shè)立工廠的決策的時(shí)候，是否已經(jīng)知道了出口限制令將要收緊，但是路透社的報(bào)道稱，無(wú)論如何，這項(xiàng)決策已經(jīng)在各方之間創(chuàng)造了“善意”。

The plant will do little to affect US reliance on Asia-based manufacturing. It is slated to produce 20,000 wafers a month once it opens—only a small fraction of the 12 million wafers that TSMC made last year alone. And by the time the plant opens, the 5-nanometer chips that it is designed to produce will no longer be the most cutting-edge chips available. The company already has plans to move to 3-nanometer chips and smaller in its Taiwan-based plants during the next few years. Given the capital costs and time it would take to transition the Arizona plant to the latest technology, this means the US would still need to maintain its supply of chips from overseas plants to access the newest advancements.

實(shí)際上，即將投產(chǎn)的新工廠對(duì)降低美國(guó)對(duì)亞洲生產(chǎn)基地的依賴性收效甚微。建成之后的臺(tái)積電美國(guó)工廠每月可生產(chǎn)2萬(wàn)個(gè)晶圓——這只是臺(tái)積電去年一年所產(chǎn)出的1200萬(wàn)晶圓的零頭。并且，到工廠正式投入運(yùn)用之時(shí)，計(jì)劃生產(chǎn)的5納米芯片也將不再是市面上最為尖端的芯片了。該公司已經(jīng)計(jì)劃在未來(lái)的數(shù)年以內(nèi)將臺(tái)灣的生產(chǎn)產(chǎn)能投入于生產(chǎn)3納米甚至更精細(xì)的芯片當(dāng)中。也就是說(shuō)，美國(guó)雖然在亞利桑那州的工廠投入了大量資本和時(shí)間，但其未來(lái)仍然需要依賴于海外工廠才能獲得最新的技術(shù)成果。

In other words, the plant will do nothing to disentangle the two countries’ supply chains from each other. “It’s probably too small to really have any huge impact on the global picture,” Thomas says.

換句話說(shuō)，新投產(chǎn)的工廠在使兩國(guó)的供應(yīng)鏈相互脫鉤方面不能起到任何作用。Thomas 認(rèn)為，“就國(guó)際產(chǎn)業(yè)全貌來(lái)講，新建工廠的能量很可能太過(guò)微弱，以至于無(wú)法造成任何重大影響。“

If the expanded export ban did in fact hold, it could also introduce unintended consequences. China accounts for a lion’s share of the revenue for a number of American semiconductor companies, such as Qualcomm, which relies on the country for two-thirds of its income. In the long term, the lost sales to Huawei and potentially the broader Chinese market could slow US innovation in chipmaking. “Capital expenditure and research and development are really high in the semiconductor industry—about 30% of total revenue,” Thomas says.

如果新的出口禁令實(shí)施到位，那也將會(huì)為美國(guó)帶來(lái)意料之外的后果。中國(guó)占據(jù)了美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體公司們的最大收入份額，例如高通公司，其三分之二的收入都來(lái)源于中國(guó)。長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看，失去了華為的銷售額以及潛在的更為廣闊的中國(guó)市場(chǎng)，很可能會(huì)減緩美國(guó)芯片制造業(yè)的創(chuàng)新發(fā)展�！把邪l(fā)部門的投入在半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)中的占比非常之高，約占據(jù)總收入的30％，” Thomas介紹到。

In recent years, the trade war has spurred China to double down on investing in its semiconductor industry. On the same day as the US government’s updated export ban, the Chinese government announced a $2.2 billion injection into its largest domestic chipmaker, SMIC. The country’s hope is that Chinese chipmakers will catch up to the state of the art within a few years and complete its domestic supply chain for cutting-edge computing hardware. In the interim, Huawei would rely on the TSMC chips that it has been stockpiling for a year, in anticipation of further US restrictions.

近年來(lái)，中美之間的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)刺激了中國(guó)，使其加倍了自身的半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的投資力度。就在美國(guó)宣布將要升級(jí)其出口禁令的當(dāng)天，中國(guó)政府就宣布對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)最大的芯片制造商中芯國(guó)際注資22億美元。中國(guó)希望自身的芯片制造業(yè)能夠在數(shù)年內(nèi)追趕上國(guó)際最先進(jìn)水平，并且能夠由此完善國(guó)內(nèi)尖端水平計(jì)算機(jī)硬件的全產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈。在此期間，華為將會(huì)依靠已經(jīng)積累的臺(tái)積電芯片庫(kù)存來(lái)維持一年的產(chǎn)能，用以應(yīng)對(duì)將會(huì)到來(lái)的來(lái)自于美國(guó)的更多的限制策略。

Thomas says there are still a lot of unknowns as to how this will shake out. “The uncertainty is to what extent China can innovate itself out of this dilemma,” he says.

Thomas認(rèn)為在這次的震蕩當(dāng)中，仍然有非常多的不確定性，“尚不確切的是，中國(guó)將在何種程度上成功地運(yùn)用其創(chuàng)新能力，以走出現(xiàn)在的兩難困境，”他如此說(shuō)到。

Either way, TSMC’s Arizona plant isn’t so much a signal of the Trump administration’s success in reshoring high-tech manufacturing. Instead, its presence highlights a complicated network of relationships that may eventually be severed on China’s terms rather than the US’s.

無(wú)論如何，臺(tái)積電在亞利桑那州的建廠計(jì)劃，對(duì)于特朗普政府的使高科技制造業(yè)回流本國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略而言，都不是一個(gè)有充足份量的良好信號(hào)。相反的是，這步舉措更加曝光了高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈當(dāng)中的錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜的關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)，這可能使中國(guó)最終獲益，而不是美國(guó)。

The US is taking a “gamble,” Thomas says.

美國(guó)正在參與一場(chǎng)“賭博”，Thomas如此總結(jié)到。

作者：Karen Hao

原載：2020年5月19日 麻省理工科技評(píng)論