橋水基金創(chuàng)始人達里奧于11月底接受彭博社“Masters in Business”節(jié)目的專訪，期間談到了他11月份出版的新書《Big Debt Crises》，關(guān)于債務(wù)危機的結(jié)構(gòu)性相似性。

　　歷史已經(jīng)證明，同樣的事情在相同的因果關(guān)系中一再發(fā)生。中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)從“修昔底德陷阱”的角度，好像是必然會發(fā)生的。

　　世界正處在一個去全球化和自給自足的過程中。達里奧認為，他并不擔心中國，認為中國是長期投資的好地方。

　　以下為采訪視頻：

　　下為采訪為文字節(jié)選：

　　修昔底德陷阱：中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)好像是必然會發(fā)生的

　　主持人：考慮到這些事情是周期性的，它們會重復(fù)，看起來非常相似——你會從歷史和今天看到什么平行之處?今天最讓你想起的是哪個時代?當前最有趣的方面是什么?

　　達里奧：最近一個類似的時期是30年代末。舉1937年為例。我為什么這么說呢?

　　與當時類似，由于印鈔和技術(shù)等原因，我們的政治兩極分化更加嚴重。我認為這是一個非常重要的問題。政治上的兩極分化導致了世界各地的民粹主義。換句話說，當個人擁有極端權(quán)力，就控制了這種情況。以“民粹主義”這個詞為例，在發(fā)達國家并不廣泛使用，直到你回到30年代，或者直到最近——當然，現(xiàn)在也很常見。

　　還有一個情況，我認為非常相似，那就是我們有一個正在崛起的力量，那就是中國。

　　DALIO: Well, the most recent period that’s analogous of this is the late ’30s. Let’s say, if you take 1937. So why do I say that?

　　Similar to then, we have, because of the printing of money and because technologies and other reasons, we have a greater amount of polarity, political polarity. I think this is an important, important issue. And that political polarity causes Populism around the world. In other words, a strong individual to come in and get control of that situation, while they’re having that type of polarity — so the word “Populism” for example, in developed countries was not widely used until — you go back to the ’30s, until more recently — now it’s, of course, common.

　　Then also we have a situation, which is quite similar, I think, in we have a rising power in the form of China.

　　主持人：因為在30年代，意大利、日本和德國都在崛起，挑戰(zhàn)現(xiàn)有的大國——如今不斷發(fā)展的中國與那個時代有多相似?

　　達里奧：我認為這不僅與那個時代類似，而且還有一個概念，叫做“修昔底德陷阱”。

　　DALIO: I think it’s not only analogous to that era, but there’s a concept — called “The Thucydides Trap” by the way.

　�。ň幷咦ⅲ骸靶尬舻椎孪葳濉保�是指一個新崛起的大國必然要挑戰(zhàn)現(xiàn)存大國，而現(xiàn)存大國也必然會回應(yīng)這種威脅，這樣戰(zhàn)爭變得不可避免。）

　　達里奧：我現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)非常非常仔細地研究了過去500年的歷史——你會發(fā)現(xiàn)，在過去500年里，有16次，一個正在崛起的大國來挑戰(zhàn)一個現(xiàn)存的大國。就像你說的，德國在歐洲，日本在亞洲。這是野獸的本性。這意味著肯定存在競爭。因此，一場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)—一股制造問題的實力相當?shù)牧α俊?/p>

　　DALIO: I’ve made a point now to study history of the last 500 years very, very carefully — what you see is that in the last 500 years there have been 16 times where a power comes to challenge an existing power, a rising power. So like you say in Germany, within Europe or Japan within Asia, that was the nature of that beast. That means that there’s certainly rivalry. So a trade war — a comparable power that creates an issue.

　　達里奧：我不是說我們要打一場槍戰(zhàn)。但我要說的是，歷史表明，戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束后會有一個和平時期，因為有一個主導力量。二戰(zhàn)后，美國不僅在經(jīng)濟上強大，而且壟斷了核能。

　　因此，由于這種權(quán)力，聯(lián)合國在紐約，世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織在華盛頓。歷史上看，崛起的力量挑戰(zhàn)現(xiàn)存的力量，就產(chǎn)生了沖突。我們正在步入一個新時代，任何人讀歷史和世界各地的決策者認識到這一點，這個問題與中國的上升意味著自然會有沖突，如何解決沖突的世界市場。

　　DALIO: I’m not saying we’re going to get into a shooting war. But I am saying that — the history that has shown that when you have wars, after a war you have a dominant power and you have periods of peace — because you have a dominant power. After World War II the United States was powerful, both economically and also it had a monopoly on nuclear power.

　　And so as a result of that power, you know, the United Nations is in New York, the World Bank and the IMF are in Washington, D.C. because it determined that. And in history, then when you have the rising power, to challenge the existing power, you have elements of conflict. I’m saying, I don’t want to overdo this, but I am saying that we are entering an era in which anybody who reads history and policy-makers around the world recognize this — that this issue with China rising means that there are naturally going to be conflicts and how do you resolve conflicts in a world market?

　　去全球化和自給自足

　　主持人：肯尼迪在書中提到，每一個大國都是通過超越國界的擴張而成為世界強國的。您如何看待當前在美國、英國和其他地方似乎正在發(fā)生的去全球化?

　　達里奧：我想你是在說兩件事。在某些情況下，全球化并非如此。比如中國的是一帶一路。我們在世界各地都看到來自中國的投資。這是全球化的一種方式。你將看到更多的人民幣貸款。你會看到世界上有更多的中國的銀行。

　　全球化的意思，是在一個地方生產(chǎn)，再以更有效的方式再其他地方銷售，沒有貿(mào)易壁壘，資本市場全球化，資本在國家間自由流動等等。

　　我認為全球化已經(jīng)達到頂峰。我們現(xiàn)在處在一個更加去全球化的環(huán)境中。因為擔心這個能感知到威脅和沖突的環(huán)境，我認為會產(chǎn)生一種去全球化的力量。

　　同樣，資本流動中也發(fā)生了同樣的情況。如果中國投資者更擔心發(fā)生沖突，那么來自美國的投資就能受到更多限制，他們也不太愿意在美國投資。

　　所以我認為——我認為我們正朝著去全球化和幾乎獨立的自給自足的方向發(fā)展。

　　DALIO: Well I think you’re talking about – there are two different things. In those cases it wasn’t so much the globalization. There was the globalization of those countries. Just like the globalization of China. We’re now seeing the one belt, one road; we’re seeing investments all around the world. That’s carrying that forward.

　　With that you will see more lending in renminbi. You will see more Chinese banks in the world and so on so forth and that will expand very, very analogist (ph).

　　Regarding globalization, which is the idea of producing at one place and selling at some place else in the most efficient way is that there’s not much trade barriers so that they can do or the globalization of capital markets, the free flow of money into and out of countries and all of that.

　　I think that that’s peaked and that we’re now in an environment in which we’ll go to a more of deglobalization kind of environment, and because of this somewhat threatening environment the perceived worry that you could have a conflict, I think that creates a force that reinforces the deglobalization, because let’s say if you’re going to produce something — if you’re producing things in China that we need in the United States by way of example, there might be a concern about doing that.

　　So if you’re producing PC’s you might say I need PC’s here, there might be a pressure to go deglobalization that sort of feeds on itself. I think that we’re seeing those kinds of pressures.

　　I think the same thing is true that could happen with capital flows. If Chinese investors are more concerned that you could have a conflict there could be more sanctions of investments in the United States. So they’re less inclined to invest in the United States and so on.

　　So those issues I think – I think we’re moving more towards deglobalization and almost independent self sufficiency is probably more of the direction.

　　中國是潛力股，適合長期投資

　�。▉碜杂^眾的）問題：關(guān)于中國，我有兩個問題。第一個問題是，你認為中國目前的債務(wù)如何？第二個問題是，鑒于中國已經(jīng)開始增加經(jīng)濟刺激力度，你是否會在這個時點增加投資?

　　達里奧：中國的債務(wù)大多以本幣計價，外幣債務(wù)規(guī)模非常小。所以現(xiàn)在你提到的是一個內(nèi)部問題。此外，向中國提供貸款的銀行也在他們的體系內(nèi)。正如我所說的，通過某種方式擴散債務(wù)危機的能力相當大。

　　他們（中國）有專業(yè)知識，知道如何把它傳播出去。所以我認為，當你觀察債務(wù)周期時，我知道有四個案例，美國如何發(fā)生重大債務(wù)危機，是什么讓他們恐慌，他們?nèi)绾文軌蚬芾砦�機。

　　譬如，八十年代，1982年的債務(wù)危機中給大家上的一課就是，我錯誤地認為我們有能力同時分散和降低利率。中國有這種能力。我認為每個人都在關(guān)注這個問題；他們太關(guān)注這個問題了，而沒有關(guān)注他們的生產(chǎn)率增長以及他們?nèi)绾卧谏�產(chǎn)率增長方面做出改變。

　　我認為，就整個生產(chǎn)力而言，低增長年份可能將是高增長年份的兩倍。如果你觀察一段時間的生產(chǎn)力指標--教育質(zhì)量和基建質(zhì)量等，就會發(fā)現(xiàn)生產(chǎn)力依然不高是有原因的。因此對我來說，這看來就像這些周期中的一個--即一個屬于他們版本的債務(wù)重組周期。

　　在經(jīng)濟周期真正引發(fā)危機之前，中國在積極主動的采取行動。比如2008年的金融危機，我們經(jīng)歷了危機，然后我們采取了積極的應(yīng)對措施。所以我不擔心中國的債務(wù)危機，也不擔心中國的債務(wù)狀況，我相信中國是一個非常適合長期投資的地方。

　　我認為中國必須成為每個人投資組合的重要組成部分;它只是向外國投資者開放。這是一個不同的地方，所以你必須了解它，但我不會詳細說明我將在那里進行哪些具體投資。

　　DALIO: Like I said, applying the template to China. Chinese debt is mostly in their local currency. The amount of foreign currency denominated debt for China is very small. OK so now you’re dealing mostly with an internal issue. Also the lenders to China are within their system and the, like I said, the capacity to handle a debt crisis by spreading it out in one way or another is quite large.

　　They have the expertise to know how to do that – to do that spreading it out. So I think when you look at debt cycles, there are four cases in which I know the United States defaulted — had major debt crisis and what rattled them all off and that they were able to be managed.

　　The lesson I gave, for example, of the 1980, ’82 debt crisis that I was so wrong about was the ability to spread that out and lower interest rates at the same time. China has that ability. I think everybody’s focused in on that and too focused in on that and they’re not focused in on their productivity growth and how they’re making changes in terms of that productivity growth.

　　I think like a bad year of growth will be probably twice as good as a good year of growth from us in terms of that whole productivity thing, and if you look at indicators of productivity over a period of time – quality of education, quality of infrastructure, things kinds of things. They have the reasons to continue to have not high productivity. So to me it looks like one of those cycles – their version of a cycle to do a debt restructuring and debt organization.

　　They’re doing it on a proactive basis before the cycle has actually caused the crisis. In most of the other cases like in our financial 2008 financial crisis, we had the crisis and then you have reactive that are doing proactive. So I’m very – I’m not worried about the debt crisis in China or the debt situation in China, and I believe it’s going to be a very good place for long term investing.

　　I think it has to be an important part of everybody’s portfolio; it’s just opening up to foreign investors. It’s a different kind of place so you have to get to know it, but I’m basically (INAUDIBLE). I won’t get into the particulars of what particular investments I would make there though.（完）

　　來源：人民幣交易與研究

本文首發(fā)于微信公眾號：量化與對沖。文章內(nèi)容屬作者個人觀點，不代表和訊網(wǎng)立場。投資者據(jù)此操作，風險請自擔。